The nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain has long been a central question in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. Despite significant advances in our understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness, many fundamental questions remain unresolved. In this paper, I propose a novel theory of cognitive architecture that posits the existence of multiple interacting consciousnesses within the brain. I argue that this framework can provide a unified explanation for a wide range of cognitive and behavioral phenomena, and offers new directions for empirical research and theoretical development.
I propose that the human brain contains multiple consciousnesses, each associated with a specific cognitive domain or function. These consciousnesses are specialized, operating with relative autonomy within their area of expertise. However, they are also deeply interactive, sharing information and influencing each other's processing.
A key feature of this architecture is that each consciousness has its own sense of self and agency. When we are engaged in a particular cognitive or behavioral task, the consciousness that specializes in that domain takes the lead, becoming the primary locus of subjective experience. The other consciousnesses continue to operate in the background, guiding our actions and thoughts in a more automatic or "autopilot" mode.
This can explain the common experience of "zoning out" or operating on "autopilot". In these states, the primary consciousness that usually governs our explicit thought and behavior has ceded control to one of the subsidiary consciousnesses. However, from the perspective of the subsidiary consciousness, it is the one that is fully engaged and "conscious", while the others are operating in the background.
Interestingly, the ease with which we can "get into focus" or regain conscious control seems to vary. Sometimes it feels effortful to wrench our attention back to the task at hand, while at other times, I can slip easily into a state of focused awareness. This suggests that the interaction and transition between consciousnesses is not always smooth or voluntary. The subsidiary consciousnesses may have their own "agenda" or inertia that resists the resumption of control by the primary consciousness.
Moreover, the quality of our cognitive and behavioral output seems to suffer when we are in these states of reduced conscious control. We make more errors, miss important details, and often face consequences for our lapses in attention. This suggests that while the subsidiary consciousnesses are capable of guiding behavior, they may not always do so with the same level of competence or consideration as the primary consciousness. They are, in a sense, "lower power experts" that can keep us going, but not always optimally.
A crucial aspect of this architecture is the existence of a shared memory space, which allows the various consciousnesses to access and contribute to a common knowledge base. This shared memory plays a vital role in binding together the disparate experiences of the individual consciousnesses, creating the illusion of a unified, continuous self.
However, I argue that this sense of unity is a construction, and that the true nature of the self is better understood as an emergent property of the interaction among multiple consciousnesses. Each consciousness has its own sense of self and agency, but it is their coordinated activity that gives rise to the overall sense of a unified "I". This has profound implications for our understanding of personal identity, responsibility, and the nature of subjective experience.
The Collaborative Cognition Theory offers a parsimonious explanation for a variety of cognitive phenomena that have long puzzled researchers. For example, it provides a natural account for the dissociation between conscious and unconscious processes. Rather than positing a strict dichotomy between conscious and unconscious systems, my theory suggests a continuum of consciousnesses, each with different levels of influence and accessibility. This can account for phenomena like implicit learning and priming, where information that is not consciously accessible still influences behavior.
Furthermore, the theory offers a potential resolution to long-standing debates about the modularity of cognition. By positing multiple interacting consciousnesses, each with its own domain of specialization, the theory incorporates both modular and interactive aspects of cognitive processing.
The Collaborative Cognition Theory has particularly striking implications for our understanding of certain mental health conditions. Disorders like dissociative identity disorder (DID) and schizophrenia, which involve profound disruptions to the unity and continuity of the self, can be readily understood within this framework.
In DID, I propose that the normal integration and coordination among the multiple consciousnesses has broken down, leading to the emergence of distinct, dissociated "alters". In schizophrenia, the communication and balance among the consciousnesses may be disrupted, leading to experiences like auditory hallucinations, which could be understood as the intrusion of one consciousness's experiences into another's.
The theory also offers a new perspective on mood disorders. The sudden, often inexplicable shifts in emotional state that characterize conditions like bipolar disorder could be explained by changes in the dominant consciousness that is guiding affect and behavior at a given moment. These ideas suggest that what we call "moods" or "emotions" might actually be the product of a specific consciousness that operates according to its own logic, which may not always be accessible to the primary consciousness.
These ideas open up new avenues for conceptualizing and treating these conditions. Rather than focusing solely on the level of explicit, conscious thought, therapies could be developed to target the underlying dynamics and interactions of the multiple consciousnesses.